Recent research on reasoning about action has shown that the traditional logic form of domain constraints is problematic to represent rami cations of actions that are related to causality of domains. To handle this problem properly, as proposed by some researchers, it is necessary to describe causal relations of domains explicitly in action theories. In this paper, we address this problem from a new point of view. Speci cally, unlike other researchers viewing causal relations as some kind of inference rules, we distinguish causal relations between defeasible and non-defeasible cases. It turns out that a causal theory in our formalism can be speci ed by using Reiter's default logic. Based on this idea, we propose a causality-based minimal change approach for representing e ects of actions, and argue that our approach provides more plausible solutions for the rami cation and quali cation problems compared with other related work. We also describe a logic programming approximation to compute causal theories of actions which provides an implementational basis for our approach.
Introduction
A sentence like \heavy rainfall normally causes oods" represents some causal relation between \heavy rainfall" and \ oods". Naturally, such causal relation can be used to represent some causal prediction. For example, if we know that there is a heavy rainfall, we would expect to have oods. From a semantical point of view, a causal relation is di erent from a logical implication. Suppose ? This research is supported in part by a grant from University of Western Sydney, Nepean. 1 Email address: yan@cit.nepean.uws.edu.au we use logical formulas to represent causal relations, then the causal relation \heavy rainfall causes oods" would be likely represented by a logical formula heavy-rainfall floods. Therefore, if heavy-rainfall is true, then from this formula, it follows that floods is true. However, note that heavy-rainfall floods is also logically equivalent to the formula :floods :heavy-rainfall.
It is also the case that :heavy-rainfall follows from :floods. But it would not be normally regarded that no ooding is a cause of the absence of rain.
In many of current formulations of reasoning about action and change, properties about the domain are normally characterized by a set of logical formulas called domain constraints, and there is no di erence between general logical constraints and causal relations. Any changes to the state of the world must be consistent with domain constraints. However, as we will see next, ignoring such di erence may result in di culties in describing e ects of actions.
Consider the simpli ed stu y room example of Ginsberg and Smith 6] . There is a constraint about the room which says that if both ducts in the room are blocked, then the room becomes stu y. This constraint is expressed by the following formula:
blocked(duct 1 )^blocked(duct 2 ) stuffy(room): (1) Suppose the initial state S 0 is given by the following:
S 0 = f:blocked(duct 1 ), blocked(duct 2 ); :stuffy(room)g.
We will de ne state formally in section 3. At the moment, it is su cient to think that a state is simply an interpretation of a rst order language.
Now consider an action of making duct 1 blocked (i.e. the e ect of the action is blocked(duct 1 )). To predict the state resulting from the performance of this action, we use Winslett's PMA 18] where a minimal change principle is employed for modeling state change. Informally, the minimal change principle in the PMA says that under the condition of satisfying domain constraints and the direct e ect of the action, the di erence between the possible resulting state and the initial state should be minimal with respect to set inclusion. Therefore, we get the following two possible resulting states:
S 1 = fblocked(duct 1 ), blocked(duct 2 ); stuffy(room)g, S 2 = fblocked(duct 1 ), :blocked(duct 2 ); :stuffy(room)g.
Note that both S 1 and S 2 satisfy the constraint (1) and the e ect of the action blocked(duct 1 ), and have minimal di erences with the initial state S 0 . But intuitively, only S 1 is our desired resulting state, while S 2 is quite implausible in some sense | why does the performance of action to make duct 1 blocked imply an indirect e ect of resulting in duct 2 unblocked? This is the so-called rami cation problem { the problem of how to derive the indirect e ects of actions.
In fact, constraint (1) is also logically equivalent to the following formula blocked(duct 1 )^:stuffy(room) :blocked(duct 2 ):
It is clear now that both S 1 and S 2 are forced by (1) and (2) respectively to have minimal di erences with S 0 with respect to the e ect of action blocked(duct 1 ). But semantically, (1) should not simply be a logical implication. It should represent a causal relation between blocked(duct 1 ), blocked(duct 2 ) and stuffy(room) { the fact that duct 1 and duct 2 blocked causes the fact that the room becomes stu y, which, for reasons similar to the sentence \heavy rainfall causes oods", is not logically equivalent to formula (2) .
In fact, the problem of ignoring the di erence between the causal relation and logical constraint in action theories has been realized by some researchers. It has been argued that to describe the indirect e ect of actions properly, it is necessary to specify the causal relation of the domain explicitly. More recently, Brewka and Hertzberg, McCain and Turner, and Lin have independently developed alternative action theories to solve this problem 2, 13, 11] . In their action theories, causality is explicitly taken into account. In particular, both Brewka and Hertzberg's and McCain and Turner's approaches view causal relations as kinds of inference rules, while Lin's method employs a speci c predicate Caused to represent causality in the circumscription-based action theory.
However, as we will argue later in this paper, all of their methods, more or less, su er from some restrictions and hence are not entirely satisfactory. The goal of this paper is to propose a new formal approach to specify causality in action theories, and show how our approach provides some new insights for solving the rami cation and quali cation problems by combining causal relations into action theories.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de nes causal relations and causal theories formally, and uses Lukaszewicz's default model theory to provide formal semantics for causal theories. Section 3 proposes a new principle for reasoning about action called the causality-based minimal change principle. A formulation of actions based on this principle is presented. Section 4 illustrates further examples to show the application of our method in reasoning about action. Section 5 extends our approach to deal with sequence of actions. Section 6 compares our method with related work in detail. Section 7 describes a logic programming approximation to compute causal theories of actions that provides an implementational basis for our method. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper with some remarks. Treating causal theories as propositional default theories, we then can use the model default theory originally proposed by Etherington and extended by Lukaszewicz 12 ] to provide formal semantics for our causal theories.
Let be a class of interpretations of language L and A a propositional formula. (A) = f' j ' 2 and ' j = Ag. is called elementary i is the class of all models of some set of propositional formulas F. De nition 1 Let be a class of interpretations of language L and a set of propositional formulas. The pair < ; > is called a structure i (i) is elementary;
(ii) For every A 2 , (A) 6 = ;.
Intuitively, a structure < ; > is interpreted as a class of all models of some belief set (i.e. ) and a set of justi cations (i.e. ) for these beliefs that are consistent with these beliefs. Note that a characteristic function f c changes a structure < ; > to another pair < 0 ; 0 >, which may or may not be a structure, by applying causal relation c as shown in the de nition. The following de nition de nes the stability of a structure in an obvious way.
De nition 4 Let < ; > be a structure and let C be a set of causal relations. We say that < ; > is stable with respect to C i relations. By f <c i > (< ; >) we denote:
< ; > if < c i >=<> (the empty sequence) < T i ; S i > otherwise where < 0 ; 0 >=< ; >, and for i = 0; 1; < i+1 ; i+1 >= f c i (< i ; i >).
De nition 6 Let < ; > be a structure, be an elementary class of interpretations of language L. Suppose < c i > is a sequence of causal relations. We say that < ; > is f <c i > -accessible from i < ; >= f <c i > (< ; ; >). We say that < ; > is accessible from with respect to C i there is a sequence (possible empty) < c i > of causal relations from C such that < ; > is f <c i > -accessible from . Now we are ready to give the de nition of the class of models of a causal theory. A detailed explanation of the following de nition is referred to Lukaszewicz However, as it will be shown later, the resulting state may not be C-consistent after some action is performed on the initial state.
An action act is speci ed by a post-condition Post(act), where Post(act) is a propositional formula and represents the direct e ect of act. Informally, action act changes the state of the world from one to another, and in the resulting state Post(act) is satis ed. Note that here we do not specify the pre-condition of action act in the sense that the executability of an action on a state can be derived from our approach. This is the so-called derived quali cation 13] that will be addressed in sections 4 and 6.
Let S 1 and S 2 be two interpretations. We say that S 1 and S 2 di er on a propositional letter p if p appears in exactly one of S 1 and S 2 . Diff(S 1 ; S 2 ) denotes the set of all di erent propositional letters between S 1 and S 2 . Let S be an interpretation, be a set of interpretations. We de ne the set of all minimal di erent interpretations of with respect to S as follows: 
The approach
Taking causality into account, we need to consider indirect e ects of actions which are related to causal relations of the domain. As was showed in section 1, the traditional minimal change approach, in which only logical constraints are considered, cannot represent these action e ects properly. Here we propose a causality-based minimal change principle. The basic idea is: during a state transition, the minimal change principle is applied generally but with exception on the causally indirect e ects of actions. For instance, in the simpli ed stu y room example, suppose that we replace constraint (1) with a causal relation blocked(duct 1 )^blocked(duct 2 ) ) stuffy(room); (3) and the current state is: S = f:blocked(duct 1 ); blocked(duct 2 ); :stuffy(room)g: (4) If an action of making duct 1 blocked, i.e. the post-condition is blocked(duct 1 ), is performed on S, and there is no other domain constraint, intuitively, we would expect the resulting state to be S 0 = fblocked(duct 1 ); blocked(duct 2 ); stuffy(room)g.
To derive this intuitive resulting state from S, we may use the minimal change principle on literal blocked(duct 2 ) but with exception on literal :stuffy(room).
The reason is that since blocked(duct 2 ) is consistent with the direct e ect blocked(duct 1 ) of the action, according to the minimalchange principle, blocked(duct 2 ) should persist during the state change. On the other hand, because of causal relation (3), we know that from blocked(duct 1 ) and blocked(duct 2 ), we should causally derive stuffy(room). That is, stuffy(room) is an causally indirect e ect of this action. So, the minimal change principle should not apply to literal :stuffy(room). Now, we are ready to formalize the idea described above.
The following two de nitions give the formal description of the causality-based minimal change approach.
De nition 8 Let C and D be the sets of causal relations and constraints of the domain respectively, S a state of the world, and act an action. Let be a maximal subset of S such that (i) D fPost(act)g is consistent, (ii) for any A ; B or A ) B in C, 6 j = :B, (iii) let = ; if there does not exist a satisfying conditions 1 and 2 above. Intuitively, this action does not change S so the resulting state should be still S. However, as the e ect of the causal relation is False, there is no satisfying conditions 1 and 2. In this case, Condition 3 ensures that a background knowledge A about the domain with respect to the action, which is needed in the causal theory CT act S; de ned in De nition 9, can be still formed by assigning = ;. Now consider the stu y room example again where D = ;, C consists of a single causal relation (3) , and the initial state S is (4). The direct e ect of action of making duct 1 blocked is blocked(duct 1 ). According to the above de nition, we have = fblocked(duct 2 )g. Note that :stuffy(room) is not included in since needs to be consistent with stuffy(room). Therefore, from fblocked(duct 1 )g together with causal relation (3), we may derive a causal e ect stuffy(room).
The derivation of causally indirect e ects of act with respect to C is achieved by specifying a causal theory CT act S; in De nition 9 and obtaining all models Mod(CT act S; ) of CT act S; . Then we specify the set of nal possible resulting states to be the union of those models in Mod(CT act S; ) for any 2 Max(S; act), such that models in Mod(CT act S; ) have minimal di erences with the the initial state S (i.e. (5) It is easy to see that if the set of causal relations is empty, our approach described above reduces to the PMA, as the following theorem states. 
Further examples
In this section, we discuss more examples to show how the approach described previously represents causal e ects of actions properly.
Example 5 Consider a baby room domain. In this domain, D consists of the following constraints: ontable(cup) safe(cup); (6) ontable(doll) safe(doll);
Intuitively, (6) and (7) (6) and (7) this follows that both the cup and doll are safe to the baby (i.e. safe(cup) and safe(doll)). According to the minimal change principle, removing the cup or doll from the table will not a ect the persistence of safe(cup) and safe(doll) respectively. However, from our commonsense on the other hand, removing the cup from the table (eg. put the cup on the oor) may cause it to be no longer safe to the baby, while removing the doll from the table should not a ect the doll's safety to the baby.
This Example 6 From our commonsense, we know that if a baby is awake, he/she normally is not quiet. But if the baby is cuddled by his/her mother, he/she normally is quiet. These can be described by the following causal relations respectively: babyawake ; :quiet; (9) babycuddled ; quiet: (10) Suppose currently the baby is awake and is not cuddled by mother and then he/she is crying. Hence the initial state is S = fbabyawake;:quiet;:babycuddledg. Now assume that the mother cuddles the baby. Our question is: Is the baby quiet after cuddled by his/her mother? Obviously, using our method presented in section 3, we have two possible resulting states S 1 = fbabyawake;:quiet;babycuddledg, and S 2 = fbabyawake;quiet;babycuddledg, which seem reasonable as both babyawake and babycuddled being true leads to two possible statuses of the baby's quietness according to causal relations (9) and (10) on ; light; (11) :on _ :power ) :light: (12) Intuitively, (11) says that the fact that switch is on normally causes the fact that the lamp lights, while (12) says that the fact that the switch is o or there is no power will cause the fact that the lamp can not light. For causal relation (11) , people may think that a precise causal relation should be onp ower ; light. But we argue that a more precise one can be on^power: broken-lamp^circuit-ok^ ; light. Since (11) is a defeasible causal relation, it is su cient to represent (11) in our domain. It is also important to note that causal relation (12) is not defeasible in the sense that the fact that the switch is o or there is no power will de nitely cause the fact that the lamp can not light. 
:alive ) :walking; (13) which says that the fact that some one is not alive causes the fact that he/she 
Comparisons with related work
The idea of introducing causal connections into action theories is not new. Hayes' work on the logic of actions 7] probably was the rst formalization of considering domain causality in an action theory. Some other researchers have also used the notion of causality to formalize the e ects of actions (eg. 9]). However, as pointed by Lin 11] , most of them only considered the direct e ects caused by actions. So their approaches did not represent the indirect e ects of actions properly. Recently, Brewka and Hertzberg 2], McCain and Turner 13] and Lin 11] have independently proposed new theories of actions in which the domain causality was explicitly taken into account. In this section, we will speci cally compare our approach with McCain and Turner's and Brewka and Hertzberg's approaches. We will also brie y discuss Lin's method. (14) where l is a propositional literal.
Note that in McCain and Turner's method, the possible resulting states are de ned by satisfying a xpoint condition with respect to the inference relatioǹ C . To illustrate the di erence between McCain and Turner's method and ours, let us rst consider the following example.
Example 9 The light-power domain revisited. Let us reconsider Example 7
within McCain and Turner's formalism. As all causal relations in their formalism are represented as (non-defeasible) inference rules, the causal relation (11) needs to be represented as on ) light: (15) Therefore, the set of causal relations of the light-power domain here is C = f(12); (15) ;. Now we argue that both solutions above seem not quite reasonable from our intuition. For instance, it is necessary for a security robot to be able to cut o the power for the safety if there is a re alarm. Similarly, no matter if there is power, the action of turning on the switch should be executable usually. From this sense, McCain and Turner's method is quite restricted. In order to obtain the desired solutions as described in Example 7, within McCain and Turner's formalism, we have to rewrite causal relation (15) to the following form on^power ) light: (16) However, as we mentioned in Example 7, it is always arguable that a more precise causal relation can be obtained by adding more causes in (16), like on^power^:broken-lamp ) light and so on. Obviously this is not always practicable to represent causal relations.
From the above example, we can see that distinguishing causal relations as defeasible and non-defeasible seems more natural and exible than just representing them as uni ed non-defeasible inference rules. In fact, the following result shows that McCain and Turner's method can be treated as a special case in our system. In the rest of this section, we will rst review Brewka and Hertzberg's method and then discuss the problem of their approach by illustrating a simple example. To keep our discussion to be consistent with our previous descriptions, we will slightly modify Brewka and Hertzberg's formulation.
Let C be a set of causal relations in which each causal relation has the form A ) B (A and B are propositional formulas), and D a set of propositional formulas to represent the set of domain constraints. A background knowledge K of the domain is de ned as K = Theory(C) D, where Theory(C) = fA B j A ) B 2 Cg. Every model in Mod(K) is called a possible world of K. The C-closure of some set of formulas H is the smallest deductively closed set that is also closed under the rules in C. We denote H`C f if f is in the C-closure of H. If F is a set of formulas in which each element of F is in the C-closure of H, we denote H`C F.
Given two possible worlds S 1 and S 2 . Diff BH (S 1 ; S 2 ) denotes the set of literals true in S 2 but not in S 1 . We should mention that Diff BH (S 1 ; S 2 ) is di erent from Diff(S 1 ; S 2 ) de ned in section 3. A set of literals P is called a causal change set of (S 1 ; S 2 ) if and only if P is a minimal subset of Diff BH (S 1 ; S 2 ) such that P (S 1 \ S 2 )`C S 0 2 and S 0 2 D`S 2 for some S 0 2 S 2 . Intuitively, a causal change set is a minimal set of changes that transforms S 1 to S 2 , given the background knowledge K. The remaining changes between S 1 and S 2 are caused by the causal change set with respect to C and also forced by the constraint D.
Suppose S, S 1 and S 2 are possible worlds. S 1 is called closer to S than S 2 , denoted as S 1 S S 2 , if and only if (i) Diff BH (S; S 1 ) Diff BH (S; S 2 ), or (ii) every causal change set of (S; S 1 ) is a subset of a causal change set of (S; S 2 ), and not vice versa.
Based on the above de nitions, the possible world S 0 resulting from S by performing action act on S is de ned as follows: S 0 is S -minimal among the worlds in Mod(K) satisfying Post(act). The set of all possible resulting worlds is denoted as Res C;D BH (S; act). The intuitive idea of Brewka and Hertzberg's formalization is quite clear: a combination of the traditional minimal change principle on models (i.e. condition (i) described above) and a minimal causal change principle (i.e. condition (ii) above) is used in reasoning about action. Unfortunately, as it will be shown next, Brewka and Hertzberg's minimal causal change principle is actually not appropriate to capture causal e ects of actions if mutual e ects between causal relations and domain constraints are involved in the reasoning.
Example 10 Consider a domain consisting of two causal relations on 1^o n 2 ) light; (17) bright(room) ) visible(painting); (18) and a single logical constraint light bright(room): (19) Intuitively, (17) says that if two switches are on, then the lamp will light, and (18) says that if the room is bright, then the painting hung on the wall is visible, while constraint (19) simply states that the fact that lamp is lighting implies the fact that the room is bright. Note that we do not specify (19) as a causal relation since formula :bright(room) :light is also true from our commonsense. Now suppose the initial state is S = f:bright(room);:light, :on 1 ; on 2 ; :visible(painting)g and an action act of turning on the rst switch is performed on S (i.e.
Post(act) on 1 ). Since K = Theory(f (17); (18) Clearly S 1 is our desired result. But it is surprising that the unintuitive world S 2 is also a possible solution.
From the above example, we can see that Brewka and Hertzberg's approach still su ers from the di culty of deriving indirect e ects of actions originally pointed by Lifschitz 10] , even if the causality was introduced in their formulation. In fact, the major problem of their formulation is that the de nition of causal change set does not capture their intuition of minimal causal change principle properly. For instance, they did not consider the possibility of mutual e ects occurring between causal relations and logical constraints. In Example 10, when literal :on 1 is changed to on 1 , causal relation (17) is triggered and this causes literal light to be true. Then constraint (19) should be applied to derive bright(room). After that, the second causal relation (18) is triggered to derive literal visible(painting). Clearly, the de nition of causal change set only covers the rst two steps and misses the last step.
On the other hand, if we use our approach described in section 3 to deal with Example 10, it is not di cult to see that the unique desired possible solution S 1 can be derived, where both causal relations (17) and (18) represents a causal rule saying that if duct 1 is blocked and duct 2 is blocked, then it will cause the uent stuffy to be true. The essential principle employed in Lin's formalization for specifying the e ects of actions is that \anything changed during a state transition must be caused". It means that any change must be related to some causal rules in the causal theory. To derive the indirect e ects of actions, a circumscription mechanism is used to minimize predicate Caused in the causal theory.
Although Lin's approach is quite di erent super cially from ours, the basic motivations are similar. Both methods use the minimization idea to specify the state change, and in order to derive the causal e ects of actions, both methods employed some nonmonotonic mechanisms (e.g., circumscription and default logic respectively). However, it is not di cult to see that a similar problem with McCain and Turner's method illustrated by Example 9 also exists in Lin's approach. At this moment, it is not clear yet if there exists some formal relationship between Lin's approach and ours.
A logic programming approximation
So far, we have not addressed the implementational issue of our approach yet. It is obvious that to put a theory to be applicable, reasonable computational costs should be provided. From the construction of our approach described in section 3, we know that causal theories of actions speci ed in De nition 9 play a central role in generating resulting states. Furthermore, we have also indicated that our causal theories of actions actually correspond to special forms of default theories. Unfortunately, it is well known that the computation of default theory, even for the propositional case, is intractable generally.
To overcome this di culty, in this section, we will describe a logic programming approximation for our approach. Speci cally, we will translate a causal theory of action de ned in De nition 9 into a corresponding extended logic program 5] so that the computation of the causal theory reduces to evaluate a relevant extended logic program. We will also show the the soundness of such translation.
Extended logic programs: A review
Similarly to the previous case, we restrict our discussion to the propositional case. A rule is a statement of the form L 0 L 1 ; ; L m ; notL m+1 ; ; notL n ; (ii) all formulas of the form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules.
We de ne that S is an answer set of , denoted Ans( ), i S is an answer set of S , i.e. S = Ans( S ). Clearly, an extended logic program can have one, more than one or no answer sets at all. The following example shows how extended logic programs can be used for knowledge representation. ). In the following, we will use extended logic programs to present a logic programming approximation for this computation.
Before we present the translation procedure, we need to make some assumptions. In causal theory CT act S; , domain constraints D is explicitly represented.
However, as we can see from section 7.1, arbitrary logic forms of constraints are clearly not expressible in extended logic programs. Therefore, we need to assume D = ; in our translation. Moreover, in order to use extended logic programs to represent causal relations C, we need to restrict each causal relation in C A ) B 
where P 1 ; ; P k are propositional literals. In other words, we only consider deterministic actions in our translation. But we will remark in section 8 that this restriction is easily released if we enhance extended logic programs by allowing disjunction occurrence in the head of a rule in logic programs.
With the above assumptions, we then can describe our translation as follows.
Let S be a state, act an action with post-condition of the form (23), C a set of causal relations with forms (21) Example 12 The light-power domain revisited. We slightly modify the causal relations in Example 7 by specifying C = fon ; light, :on ) :light, :power ) :lightg. Let S = flight;on;powerg be the initial state and suppose an action of cutting o the power (i.e. Post(act) :power) is performed on S. Obviously, there exists unique = fong which is a maximal subset of S satisfying the conditions that fPost(act)g is consistent and 6 j = :light and 6 j = light.
According to the above description, the logic program approximation act S; of causal theory CT act S; consists of the following rules:
:power , on , light on, not :light, :light :on, :light :power.
It is easy to see that act S; has a unique answer set f:light;on;:powerg, which is also the unique resulting state. Clearly, this solution coincides with the result obtained in Example 7.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new approach for reasoning about action. We have seen that to specify e ects of actions properly, we need to represent the domain causality explicitly in action theories, and distinguishing causal relations as defeasible and non-defeasible cases does provide us more exible capabilities to handle problems of reasoning about action e ects.
It should be noticed that specifying a causal relation to be defeasible or nondefeasible is domain-speci c. It seems that there is no a general principle to de ne which causal relation should be defeasible and which should not be. Given the problem domain but with di erent causal relations, di erent solutions may be derived even for the same action. For instance, in Example 8 presented in section 4, if a causal relation that the fact that some one is not alive causes the fact that he or she is not walking is speci ed to be defeasible in the sense that even if a person is not alive, he or she can be moved by someone else, then we will not be able to derive the quali cation of an action with e ect walking. It is interesting to note that if only defeasible causal relations are speci ed in a domain, all actions then become executable to any state and no action quali cations may be derived (we assume that every action's post-condition is consistent with domain constraints).
The other feature of our approach is that domain constraints still have their conventional functions and logical forms in our formalism. We believe that having explicit representation for domain constraints is important in action theories, as in many situations, domain constraints describe some physical properties about the world, and these properties may not re ect a natural causality of the domain. For instance, in the blocks world, we usually have a domain constraint :on(box;box) saying that any block can not be located on itself. The other function of the domain constraint is to force some ramications during the change that may not be captured by causal relations. For example, if we have a constraint stating that any object can only be located on the table or on the oor, then an action of removing an object from the table will lead to the e ect that the object will be on the oor. In such a domain, we do not need to specify an extra causal relation like that \the fact that an object is not on the table causes the fact that the object must be on the oor".
Finally, the logic programming approximation to compute causal theories of actions certainly provides an e ective way to implement our approach. Here we should mention that, however, this approximation is not complete with the following restrictions: (a) as arbitrary forms of logic constraints are not expressible in extend logic programs, we therefore require D = ; for this translation; 
